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UNIVERSITITEKNOLOGI MARA (UiTM) 
An Introduction 
Universiti Teknologi MARA (formerly known as MARA Institute of Technology) 
is Malaysia's largest institution of higher learning. It had its beginnings in 1956 as 
Dewan Latihan RID A, a training centre under the supervision of the Rural Industrial 
Development Authority (RIDA). 
Nine years later Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) Act, 1965 provided for a change 
of name from Dewan Latihan RIDA to Maktab MARA (MARA College). The Act 
also defined a new role for the MARA College - to train Bumiputras (literally it 
means "the sons of the soil" - ie the indigenous people) to be professionals and 
semi-professionals in order to enable them to become equal partners with other 
ethnic groups (ie the former migrants, especially the Chinese and Indians) in the 
commercial and industrial enterprises of the nation. 
In 1967 Maktab MARA was renamed Institut Teknologi MARA(ITM) (or MARA 
Institute of Technology). In August 1999, the Institute was upgraded to university 
status and named Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM). 
As pan of the government's affirmative action policies, UiTM provides education 
and training in a wide range of sciences, technology, business management and 
professional courses to 56,408 full-time students in 2000. Another 3,156 have 
enrolled for off-campus courses. In addition, there are 7,725 students in distance-
learning and flexible-learning programmes. 
The main campus stands on a 150-hectare piece of land on a picturesque hilly area 
of Shah Alam, the state capital of Selangor Darul Ehsan, about 24 kilometres from 
the city of Kuala Lumpur. 
The Universiti has also established branch campuses in the various states of the 
Federation: Sabah (1973), Sarawak(1973), Perlis (1974), Terengganu (1975), Johor 
(1984), Melaka (1984), Pahang (1985), Perak (1985), Kelantan (1985), Penang 
(1996), Kedah (1997) and Negeri Sembilan (1999). 
The Universiti currently offers 184 programmes conducted by 18 Faculties. These 
programmes range from post-graduate to pre-diploma or certificate levels. More 
than half of these are undergraduate and post-graduate programmes, while diploma 
programmes account for an additional 39%. Some of the post-graduate programmes 
are undertaken in the form of twinning programmes, through collaboration with 
universities based overseas. 
The following 18 Faculties currently run programmes in the University: 
Accountancy; Administration and Law; Applied Science; Architecture Planning & 
Surveying; Art & Design; Business & Management; Civil Engineering; Education; 
Electrical Engineering; Hotel & Tourism Management; Information Technology 
& Quantitative Science; Mass Communication; Mechanical Engineering; Office 
Management & Technology; Performing Arts; Science; Sport Science & Recreation. 
In addition to faculties there are 17 'academic centres' to cater various academic, 
business, technological and religious needs of the campus community. They are 
Extension Education Centre (PPL); Language Centre; Centre for Preparatory 
Education; Resource Centre for Teaching and Learning; Total Quality in UiTM 
(CTQE); Department of Academic Quality Assurance & Evaluation; Computer 
Aided Design Engineering Manufacturing (CADEM); Malaysian Centre for 
Transport Studies (MACTRANS); Text Preparation Bureau; Bureau of Research 
& Consultancy; Malaysian Entrepreneurship Development Centre (MEDEC); 
Islamic Education Centre; Centre for Integrated Islamic Services; Business & 
Technology Transfer Centre. 
THE FACULTY OF ADMINISTRATION AND LAW, UiTM 
The Faculty of Administration and Law (formerly known as the School of 
Administration and Law) was founded in 1968. It began as a centre offering British 
external programmes, the LLB (London - External) and the Chartered Institute of 
Secretaries (now Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators). The only 
internal programme offered then was the Diploma in Public Administration and 
Local Government (DPALG). In 1978 the LLB (London - External) programme 
was terminated and replaced by the current internal LLB programme. The LLB is 
a three-year academic degree course based on the structure of the undergraduate 
law programmes normally offered in the British universities. Unlike most of the 
British LLB programmes, however, the LLB at the Faculty is conducted on a 
semester system. In 1982 the Faculty introduced a one-year LLB (Hons) programme 
towards which graduates of the LLB could advance their studies. The LLB (Hons) 
is a professional and practice-oriented programme that provides training to students 
for their career in the legal practice as Advocates and Solicitors. The delivery of 
the curriculum for this course adopts the method and strategy of simulated or 
experiential learning. Because of the unique experience it provides to students in 
their legal training this course has acquired wide recognition and acceptance among 
the Malaysian public. 
The Faculty of Administration and Law enjoys strong connections with the legal 
profession, particularly the Malaysian Bar, and the industry. It takes pride in 
continually developing pioneering options in its degree programmes, both at the 
academic and professional levels. In 1995 the Faculty introduced the degree of 
Bachelor in Corporate Administration (Hons) to train young and bright Malaysians 
to hold office as Company Secretaries. In the pipe-line are some new courses -
Bachelor of Law and Management (Hons), Bachelor of Administrative Science 
(Hons), Masters of Law and Executive Masters in Administrative Science. 
The Faculty currently comprises some 70 academic staff from both the disciplines 
of law and administration. It has about 600 students reading for the LLB and LLB 
(Hons) and 500 students reading for the Diploma in Public Administration and 
Bachelor in Corporate Administraiion (Hons). The Faculty admits about 200 
students each year. 
Main Entrance to Shah Alam Campus 
EDITORIAL NOTES 
This law journal had a long period of gestation in the Faculty. There were several 
attempts in the past, by individuals or the faculty collectively, to bring about its 
parturition. It is no easy task to initiate an academic journal, regardless of the 
discipline it represents. It demands a high degree of commitment in time, energy 
and attention. It calls for an intense love of labour for scholarship among a critical 
mass of the faculty members, either in the editorial board or as article contributors. 
But, at long last, this journal has arrived. 
Many factors led to this successful launch. The recent elevation of this institution 
to university status created its own impetus. Our strong law programme and its 
capable teachers demanded, and will benefit from, this specialist forum for aca-
demic debate and analysis. There is support within the legal profession and among 
our many distinguished alumni for such a journal, too. We are delighted by the 
synergy and collaborative goodwill the notion of a journal has evoked. So, we 
were able to marshal much expertise and experience to bring out this inaugural 
issue of the Journal. 
Academic faculty at UiTM are part of the worldwide network of academia. We 
must participate in discussions and debates over issues that are not only of direct 
academic and professional concern but also of importance to the general public. A 
journal such as this facilitates reflective and disciplined participation. In doing so, 
it helps the Faculty, and the University, to undertake its noble role in serving the 
general community. 
A learned journal is one of the major measures by which the weight and prestige of 
an institution are judged. It reflects the institution's maturity and ability to manage 
and conduct its specialist discipline. It reflects a confidence among its faculty to 
offer themselves to be evaluated in the open market place of ideas, and it serves 
notice of the faculty's readiness to serve the community at large. This Journal, in 
no small measure, marks the coming of age of the Faculty. 
The Journal functions also as a meeting point for law teachers and practitioners 
who share a common interest in various areas of law. It provides them a source of 
information on the current and topical issues in their specialised areas. It creates a 
forum for the exchange of ideas and for engaging in discourse over sometimes 
intricate and often vexed legal issues. Much is gained by the legal fraternity, as 
well as the legal system, through such engagements and encounters. 
Law teachers, as members of the broader academic community, are aware that it is 
no longer tenable for them to function solely within their traditional ivory towers, 
isolated from the reality of the world outside. For career and professional advance-
ment, and for taking their rightful role in the community, no academic can confine 
herself to her classroom or departmental audience. She must reach for a wider 
audience. The recognition (or lack of it) that she gains from her peers, both within 
and without the discipline, will speak for her standing and credibility in the com-
munity, both scholarly and otherwise. This Journal will serve as one channel for 
the Faculty members to reach that wider audience. 
There are relatively few academic legal journals in this country. Most existing 
legal publications cater for the professional needs of legal practitioners. One rami-
fication of this is that there are few discourses on theoretical and abstract legal 
issues. Yet these issues are important for the fuller appreciation and development 
of the law and the legal system, by the legislature, the reform bodies and the courts. 
This Journal will try to answer this need and stimulate discussions on issues that 
are of interest and relevance to the academic and broader communities. 
The labour and skill required for this Journal to thrive will challenge the staff of 
the institution and the supporters of this initiative among the profession and the 
wider community. We hope the Journal sails well in fair winds. 
Our wish is that Malaysia's legal profession, its legal academic circle and the many 
students and practitioners of law in this country and elsewhere will benefit from 
this forum for analysis and reform. We hope this Journal makes an important con-
tribution to debate on vital legal matters in our society. We hope, too, that our quest 
for self-expression and critical reflection among the members of the legal academia 
will be assisted by this Journal. It is with great pleasure and some satisfaction at 
the completion of this worthy task that we complete this inaugural Editorial. 
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RATIFICATION OF DIRECTORS' BREACHES OF 
DUTY: PROBLEMS, PERSPECTIVES 
AND SCOPE FOR REFORM 
byS.T.LINGAM* 
Introduction 
The ability of the company to avoid transactions made by directors in breach of 
their duties as well as its ability to make the wrongdoing directors personally 
liable to it for such breach may be hindered where there has been a "ratification" 
of such breach. This article seeks to highlight the problems associated with the 
present legal position regarding ratification of a director's breach of duty and to 
suggest possible reforms taking into account developments in other common law 
jurisdictions. 
What is ratification? 
Ratification has been variously described as "adoption", "affirmation", "confir-
mation", and "approval".1 Ratification may take the form of a prior approval by 
the company2 or the ex post facto acceptance' by it of a transaction which was 
outside the authority of the director concerned. It is generally accepted that mem-
bers in general meeting may ratify acts of directors. Upon a valid ratification, the 
acts of the director will bind the company and the wrong doing director is absolved 
from any liability to the company for its breach. According to Gower,4 
"It is a normal principle of the law relating to fiduciaries that those to whom the 
duties are owed may release those who owe the duties from their legal obligations 
and may do so either prospectively or retrospectively provided that full disclosure 
of the relevant fact is made to them in advance of the decision. Consequently, it has 
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Administration and Law, UniversitiTeknologi MARA, Malaysia, LLM (London), 
CLP (Hons) (Malaysia), LLB (Hons) (London), Advocate and Salicitor. High Court of Malaya. 
1 See: R J C Partridge, "Ratification and the release ofdireclors from personal liability" (1987) C U 122 and the 
cases cited in footnotes 2-5 thereof. 
2 Seei NewZeafandNetheriandsSociety •'Orange" Incv King s{l973)2ALLER\222-,MultinationolGasand 
Petrochemical Co v Multinational gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd [1983) Ch 258; Wimhrop Invesments 
Udv WinnsLtd[1975] 2NSWLR666. 
3 e.g. Hogg v Cramphom Lrrf[1967]Ch254: Re Cape BretonOH5)29ChD195;BainfordvBainford (1970) 
Ch2 l2 ;AWj West Transportation Co Ltd v Bealty (\%X1) l2AppCas589. 
4 LC B Gower, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Max well London 1997) 644-645. 
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long been recognised that an ordinary majority of the shareholders in general meeting 
may release the directors from many of their fiduciary duties, provided that at least 
the company is a going concern". 
Further, "Ratification has a twin effect. It operates so as to make binding on the 
company a transaction which might otherwise be impeachable as having been en-
tered in breach of fiduciary duty and so as to release the directors from liability to 
the company for breach of duty."5 
However, the law on ratification is not as clear and settled as it ought to be and 
leaves a number of issues unsettled. Numerous articles have been written in this 
area which has variously been described as, "an uncleared minefield"6 "singularly 
muddled",7 "murky"3 and, "a concept that has outlived its usefulness".9 
A proper appreciation of the concept of ratification, the surrounding difficulties 
and an attempt to unravel those difficulties is necessary for a more comprehensive 
discussion of the pitfalls that may frustrate the company or a minority shareholder 
in the attempt to curb self-dealing by directors or cure its ill effects. Though at 
times one is inclined to feel that ratification is indeed "a concept that has outlived 
its usefulness",10 the better view seems to be that, "the doctrine of ratification is 
necessary, in the context of modern commercial life"." 
Problems of Ratification 
A. The power to ratify 
Ratification in the corporate context has its origins in the law of fiduciary obliga-
tions and trusts. Professor Finn states the general rule thus: "Where a fiduciary 
has a personal interest in a decision he intends taking in his representative capacity 
he can, as a general rule, immunise himself both from the conflict rule and from 
the fiduciary duty by making a full disclosure of his interest to his beneficiaries 
and by obtaining their consent to his decision notwithstanding his personal inter-
est".13 
It is also established law that directors are fiduciaries in relation to the company. 
Thus, breaches of duties by the directors are said to be capable of ratification by 
5 Ibid at 645 
6 Fridman, "Ratification of Directors Breaches" (1992) IOC & SLJ 252. 
7 Cranston, "Limiting Directors Liability: Ratification, Exemption and Indemnification" (1992) JBL 197 at 
199. 
8 Karen Yeung, "Disentanglingfflhe Tagled Skein: The Ratification of Directors' Actions" (1992) 2 AU 343. 
9 Fridman, above n 6. 
10 Ibid at 267. 
11 R Baxt, "Judges in their own cause: The ratification of Directors' Breaches of Duty" (197S) 5 MULR 16. 
12 P D Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (the Law Book Compony Sydney 1977) 51 and also cited in Saul 
Fridman/'Ratification of Directors Breaches" (1992) C & SLJ 252 at 253. 
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the fully informed beneficiary, viz, the company. However, the concept of ratifica-
tion has been applied in the context of the modern day corporation without suffi-
cient consideration having been given to a number of issues, such as who may 
ratify, what breaches may be ratified, and what is the effect of such ratification (1) 
upon the transaction, (2) upon the liability of the directors and (3) upon minority 
shareholders in the light of the rule in Foss v Harbottle?n 
B. Who may ratify? 
The commonly accepted view is that breaches of duties by directors may be rati-
fied by the company in general meeting. Palmer14 states that in general, full disclo-
sure by the shareholders in general meeting would relieve the directors from li-
ability. Gore Browne15 states, "the most important way in which a director may be 
relieved from liability for breach of duty is ratification by ordinary resolution of 
the general meeting, or by the approval of all members having voting rights at a 
general meeting...". 
Gower also accepts this view. According to him, "It is a normal principle of the 
law relating to fiduciaries that those to whom the duties are owed may release 
those who owe the duties from their legal obligation and may do so either prospec-
tively or retrospectively, provided that full disclosure of the relevant fact is made 
to them in advance of the decision. Consequently, it has long been recognised that 
an ordinary majority of the shareholders in general meeting may release the direc-
tors from many of their fiduciary duties, provided at least that the company is a 
going concern".16 Numerous cases may be cited in support of this generally ac-
cepted view.17 
The board of directors, too, have sometimes been held to be capable of ratifying 
the acts of individual directors." However, the cases may be distinguished on their 
particular facts and consent of the board is usually inadequate.19 
Assuming that principles of equity may be applied in the context of the modern 
day corporation and that breaches by the directors as fiduciaries may be ratified by 
13 <1843)2Hare46l. 
14 Sir Francis Palmer, Palmer's Company Law, (vol.2 Sweet & Maxwell, London) 8134 at para 8.539. 
15 Boyle and Sykes (ed), Core Browne on Companies, (Vat. 2 44'1' edn Jordans Bristol) para 27.21. 
16 L C B Gower Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet SL Maxwell London 1997)644-645. See 
also: R R Pennington, Company law (Butterworths London 1995) 745. 
17 Eg. Bamford V Bomford [ 1970J Ch 212; Hogg v Crairtpkorn [1967] Ch 254; Irvine v Union Bank of Australia 
(1877) 2 App. Cas 366; Gram v United Kingdom Swithback Rly (1 880) 40 Ch. D 135; North- West Transpor-
tation Ltd v Beatty US$7) 12 App Cas 589; Pavtides v Jensen (1956) Ch 565; Winthrop Invesments Ltd v 
Winns Lid [1975] 2 NSWLR 666. 
18 See: Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper (1966) 58 DLR (2d) 1; Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson (1978) 
18ALR I. 
19 See; H A J Ford, R P Austin and I M Ramsay, Ford's Principles of Corporation Law (Bulterworths Sydney 
1997) 386. 
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the beneficiary, difficulties arise in identifying the beneficiary for the purposes of 
ratification. 
That the directors are fiduciaries vis a vis the corporation is now beyond question. 
That the corporation is a separate legal person is equally beyond question. There-
fore if ratification is to be applicable in the corporate context, only the corporation 
itself may ratify. 
Who then is the corporation for the purpose of ratification? Any suggestion that 
either the board of directors or the majority of the shareholders in general meeting 
could automatically be regarded as the corporation itself would fly in the face of 
Salomon's case.10 
Despite this, as has been seen, case law has proceeded on the basis that the major-
ity of the shareholders in general meeting are competent to ratify directors! breaches 
of duty. Though this is out of line with the concept of corporate personality, one 
has to concede that such an approach is most practical. The corporation, being an 
artificial entity, has neither a body nor mind of its own. It has to be personified 
either through the corporators acting as a collective body via the general meeting 
or the board of directors. 
Practical though this approach may be, it is not without further criticism. In the 
case of ratification by a majority at a general meeting, such ratification may be 
procured through the votes of the wrongdoing director acting in his capacity as a 
shareholder.11 Thus, a wrongdoing director who himself has a majority shareholding 
in the company, or is able to garner the support of the majority of the shareholders 
through his influence or through the proxy machinery, would remain unaccount-
able to the company for his breach. In the case of ratification by the board of 
directors, the likely bias is obvious. The board may well be composed of his friends 
and cronies and, as one writer observes,:: 
"Indeed, if one of the underlying reasons for strict fiduciary obligations is to ensure 
that those who control corporate assets and enterprise do not succumb to the 
temptations that inevitably arise, then it is hard to justify on policy grounds a rule 
which allows directors effectively to act as judges in their own cause". 
C. What breaches may be ratified? 
Assuming that the power to ratify may reside in the general meeting, or, possibly, 
in the board of directors, the next pertinent question is whether all forms of breaches 
20 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 
21 North- West Transportation Ltd v Beany, Bamford V Bamford, Winthmp Investments Udv Winns lid cited in 
footnote 17 above;. See also: R. Baxt, "Judges in their own cause: The Ratification of the Directors Acts: An 
Anglo-American Comparison" (1978)41 MLR 161. 
22 Saul Fridman, "Ratification of Directors* Breaches" (1992) C & SLJ 252 at 266. 
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of fiduciary duty are capable of being ratified. Here, too, case law does not provide 
a clear answer. 
Where directors have acted for an improper purpose, the courts have generally 
accepted that the general meeting may ratify the breach. The bulk of case law in 
this area involves the issue of shares for an improper purpose, in particular, the 
forestalling of a takeover bid. The courts have been consistent in their stand that 
such issues may be ratified by the company in general meeting." However, where 
there is fraud or oppression, courts would intervene.24 As pointed out by Professor 
Baxt,25 difficulties arise where the majority in voting to ratify the breach also had 
the improper purpose in mind and did not, therefore, vote for the purposes of the 
company. This matter gets further complicated when the directors themselves use 
their votes in their capacity as shareholders to ratify the issue of shares. 
In Ngurli vMcCann26 it was established that resolutions of shareholders in general 
meeting would not be effective if the purpose of the majority of the meeting was 
otherwise than for the purposes of the company as a whole. 
Mahony J.A. in Winihrvp's case77 stated that it has not yet been settled whether, if 
the purposes of the majority was the same as that of the directors(i e the defeating 
of a takeover bid), that will be an improper purpose of that majority which would 
make the resolutions ineffective. 
Professor Baxt28 suggests that it would be better in such cases to require an inde-
pendent group of shareholders to ratify the transaction. 
In relation to self-dealing situations involving directors contracting with the com-
pany, the classic decision, which has not yet been expressly overruled is that of 
North-West Transportation Ltd v Beatty.29 That case held that such dealings may 
"be affirmed or adopted by the company, provided that such affirmation or adop-
tion is not brought about by unfair or improper means, and is not illegal or fraudu-
lent or oppressive towards the shareholders who oppose it".-10 
Thus, a director involved in such a self-dealing may have the matter ratified by 
exercising his right to vote his own shares at the general meeting, so long as he 
23 Hoggy v Cramphorn Ltd. 0966) 3 WLR. 1995; Howard Smith Ltd v Antpol Petroleum Ltd [1974J AC 821; 
Bamford v Bamfotd [ 1970] Ch 212. 
24 See; Clemens v Clemeas <£ Others (1976) 2 ALL ER 268 and comments of Buckley J in Hogg v Cramphom, 
Ibid. 
25 "Judges in Their Own Cause", n 21 above. 
26 (1953)90CLR 425. 
27 Above, n 21. 
28 Above, n 25. 
29 (l887)l2Appcas589. 
30 Ibid. Per Sir Richard Baggalays at 595. 
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acts honestly and makes disclosure to the company of his interest in the relevant 
contract. 
In cases where the director concerned himself has an absolute majority, or is able, 
by his influence within the company, to obtain a majority vote in his favour, it is 
almost certain that abuses will continue. 
Many jurisdictions provide for articles which prevent interested directors from 
voting to ratify such contracts at a meeting of the board of directors (in cases 
where ratification by the board is allowed). It is rather incongruent that case law 
allows a director to vote in his capacity as a shareholder whereas articles can nega-
tive his vote in his capacity as a director.31 
A viable alternative would be the US position which requires ratification by an 
independent majority of shareholders and a consideration of the fairness of the 
price paid by the corporation. 
In relation to self-dealing situations involving the usurpation of corporate oppor-
tunities, the issue of ratification also raises difficulties. The two most often cited 
cases to highlight the problem are that of Cook v Deeksn and Regal (Hastings) Ltd 
v Gulliver,** 
In the former case, three out of four directors (who were also the only sharehold-
ers) diverted a corporate opportunity to a company which they had formed. Subse-
quently, they called a general meeting at which they ratified their action using their 
majority votes. The court held that the ratification was not valid. 
On the other hand, in the fatter case, the directors had bought shares in a subsidiary 
in circumstances where the company itself could not afford to take up those shares. 
The court, while holding that the directors had breached their duty to the company, 
also held that it was a breach that was ratifiable by the company in general meet-
ing.54 
It is not an easy task to reconcile the cases. Both can be regarded as cases involv-
ing the expropriation of corporate assets or opportunities. Why, in Cook v Deeks 
was ratification not allowed whereas in Regal (Hastings) it was? Was it because 
the cases can be distinguished on the basis that in fact only the former involved a 
misappropriation of corporate assets while the latter involved merely the making 
of an incidental profit? Or was it because in the former case the directors had 
31 R Bail. "Judges ia their own Cause: The ratification of Directors' Breaches of Duty" above n 21 at p 43. 
32 (1916) I A.C554. 
33 [1942] IALL ER378. 
34 See also: Furs Ltd v Tomkies (1936) 54 CLR 583. 
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profited at the expense of the company whereas in the latter case there had been no 
harm to the company at all? Could it also be said that the cases can be distin-
guished on the basis that in Cook v Deeks the directors had acted fraudulently 
whereas in Regal they had acted bona fide in the interests of the company. A clear 
answer to this is yet to be found. 
D. The effect of ratification 
A further problem relating to ratification is the question of its real effect. It is often 
presumed that upon ratification, the transaction concerned is binding upon the 
company and directors are absolved from liability to the company for their breach 
of duty. Further, as a result of the rule in Foss v Harbottle™ ratification by the 
majority prevents the minority shareholder from instituting a derivative action, 
except in cases falling within its recognised exceptions. Thus, where there is fraud 
or oppression, the minority may bring a derivative action. But in those situations 
where it is unclear whether these elements are present but the wrongdoing direc-
tors have used their own votes to ratify the breach, the position of the minority 
shareholder's standing to institute an action needs to be reconsidered. 
(a) Release from liability 
Assuming that the general meeting is competent to ratify the acts/transactions done 
by the directors on behalf of the company, a generally accepted consequence of 
such ratification, as we have seen above, is that the act/transaction now becomes 
binding upon the company. The company and third party will then be able to sue 
each other to enforce it. However, it is also often thought that such ratification 
results in the absolving of the directors of their personal liability to the company 
for breach of duty to the company.5* 
Closer scrutiny of the concept of ratification, however, indicates that one ought to 
be hesitant in concluding that any ratification by the general meeting (or for that 
matter the board of directors) would automatically result in the release of the di-
rectors from liability. Partridge" argues that such conclusion is incorrect and that 
any purported release of the directors from liability ought not to be valid on ground 
of lack of consideration. Such release is also not supported by estoppel, nor is it a 
consequence of the corporate constitution.38 The importance of the distinction be-
tween a prospective release of a director from his duty to the company and a sub-
sequent release, by ratification, of an accrued right against the wrongdoing direc-
tor is also highlighted. While mere accord is sufficient for a prospective release 
35 (l843)2Hare461. 
36 See Regal (Hasting) Ltd v Gulliver, above n 33; Pnidential Assurance Co. Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No. 
211982] Ch 204 at 220. 
37 R J C Partridge, "Ratification and the release of direslots from personal liability" (1987) CL1 122. 
38 Ibid at 126-135. 
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from such duty, a subsequent release requires both accord and satisfaction. Hence 
a subsequent release by ratification cannot be effective to prevent a company from 
suing the director concerned for the loss arising from the breach. 
The U K has to a certain extent recognised that the mere ratification by a company 
in general meeting does not of itself release a director from liability. In the context 
of ultra vires transactions it has now been statutorily provided under s 35 of the 
Companies Act 1985 that a company may ratify an ultra vires transaction by a 
special resolution. However, such resolution would not automatically have the 
effect of releasing the directors from liability to the company. In order to release 
the directors from such liability to the company, a separate special resolution to 
that effect has to be passed. 
Statutory amendments ought to be introduced to require separate resolutions in 
order to release directors from liability to the company in respect of breaches which 
have resulted in actionable claims against them by the company. A decision by the 
company to relieve a director from such liability should be effected by special 
resolution, 
(b) Ratification and the right to institute a derivative action 
At common law, it was generally accepted that ratification by the majority, or even 
the possibility of ratification by the majority, has the effect of depriving a share-
holder of his right to institute a derivative action,*1 
The justification for denying the minority shareholder the right to institute a de-
rivative action in the case of ratifiable breaches was that the courts would be likely 
to give effect to the voice of the majority and the minority shareholder's suit would 
be futile. The majority's voice was equated with that of the company itself. Deci-
sions of the company were matters of internal regulation to be taken by the appro-
priate organ of the company authorised to do so under the articles of association. It 
was not the business of the court to question the wisdom of corporate decisions 
properly taken. Thus, the minority would have no locus standi to initiate a deriva-
tive action (unless it fell within the relevant exceptions to the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle). 
A couple of matters need greater consideration: 
(1) Whether actual or intended ratification ought to deny the minority share 
holder standing to sue (i e to initiate a derivative action) in all cases of a 
ratifiable breach. 
39 See Wedderbum: "Shareholders' right and the Rule in Foss v HarbottJe" (1957) CU 194; Edwards v Haltiwetl 
1195012 All ER 1066; McDougalt v Gardiner (No.2) (1S75) 1 Ch D 13. 
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(2) Whether statutory intervention is necessary or desirable to enable a minority 
shareholder to institute an action on behalf of the company in situations where 
he lacks locus standi to initiate a derivative action. 
On the first issue, a preliminary objection to denying a disgruntled minority share-
holder a right to sue on behalf of the company is whether a majority of the mem-
bers of the company can in fact ratify the acts of the agents of the company viz the 
directors. This has been discussed earlier.40 
As we seen, the Salomon principle would dictate that only the corporation is capa-
ble of ratifying any act done on its behalf. Despite this, for practical purpose the 
will of the majority is best accepted as the will of the company for validating the 
transactions done on its behalf and perhaps also for forgiving the wrongdoing 
directors. 
But should such ratification, or the possibility of such ratification, deny the minor-
ity shareholder of access to the courts to protect the company in situations which 
may otherwise justify intervention by the courts (aside from the exceptions to the 
Foss v Harbonle rule)? While it has long been thought that it is not the business of 
the court to manage the affairs of the company and that such matters are best left to 
the shareholders and directors,41 it has been observed that, "whether this approach 
is a wholly adequate basis for judicial policy in the area of modern company law is 
open to doubt" .A1 
Such a rule certainly denies the minority shareholder the opportunity to have the 
merits of his case given due consideration by the courts. 
There have been cases where, despite the fact that the breaches concerned were 
ratifiable, minority shareholders have been allowed to sue. A notable example is 
Alexander v Automatic Telephone Co4i where the breach by the directors arose as 
a result of their decision to make a call on shares payable on allotment by all the 
subscribers except three directors who had the largest shareholding. The remain-
ing two directors who had been parties to that decision initiated an action against 
the directors and the company for a declaration that all the shareholders were bound 
to pay on the call. Despite the fact that the directors had acted bona fide, and the 
breach was one that could possibly have been ratified by the majority in general 
meeting, the court of appeal granted the relief claimed. Lindley M R observed that 
this case was not one of mere internal management which could be left to the 
shareholders to settle among themselves. Wedderburn44 considered that if such 
40 See page 4. above. 
41 See Shmileworfh Y COX Bros & Co (Maindenhead) Ltd (W21) 2 KB 9. 
42 KW Wedderdum: "Shareholders* right and the rule in Foss v Harbonle" (1957) C L J 194 at 194. 
43 (1900) 2 Ch. 56 and referred to in Wedderbum's article at n 42 above. 
44 Above n 42 
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cases were to be followed they indicate that "real" exceptions to the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle do exist. 
Hogg v Cramphorn45 and Bamford v Bamford* can also be regarded as examples 
of such cases, though it must be pointed out that the issue of the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle was not brought up in either of those cases to challenge the standing of 
the plaintiffs. This may indicate that a strict application of the rule is not favoured 
by the courts.47 It has been argued"8 that the Australian case of Residues Treatment 
& Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd*9 is a further indication of this trend. 
That case also involved the allotment of shares by directors in order to frustrate an 
impending takeover. The plaintiff's claim had been struck out by the court below 
on the basis that they lacked locus standi to initiate the action. On appeal, the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia surmounted the hurdle posed by 
the rule in Foss v Harbottle by concluding that the breach of fiduciary duty on the 
part of the directors would have the effect of diminishing the voting power of their 
shares. They had a personal right not to have it so diminished. It then fell within 
the "personal rights" exception to the Foss v Harbottle rule, thereby providing the 
plaintiffs with the necessary locus standi. 
This unsatisfactory position is criticised heavily by Welling,50 who condemns as 
misconceived the idea/concept that a majority of shareholders or board of direc-
tors can extinguish a corporate right to an action to remedy a breach of duty and 
the idea that ratification by the majority of shareholders or board of directors can 
extinguish the right of the individual shareholder to initiate an action. 
There is a need to have greater clarity in the law concerning the effect of ratifica-
tion or the possibility of ratification upon the right of the individual shareholder to 
institute an action on behalf of the company. The present position is inadequate to 
curb wrongdoing directors from using either their majority shareholding in the 
company or their position to influence the majority to secure a ratification of a 
ratifiable breach. In particular, self-dealing directors may take advantage of the 
paralysing effect of ratification or the possibility of such ratification on the right of 
the minority shareholder to institute an action to protect the company. Unless 
courts are, indeed, willing to adopt a more liberal attitude and give greater leeway 
in favour of a minority shareholder attempting to protect the company, there is a 
need to consider further statutory reforms. This brings us to the second issue, which 
it appears must be answered in the affirmative. 
45 [1966] 3 All ER 420. 
46 [1968] 2AHER 655. 
47 See Karen Yeung:, "Disentangling the Tangled Skein: The Ratification of Directors actions" (1992) 66 AU 
343. 
48 Ibid ai p 347-348 
49 {198S)6ACLCI160. 
50 B Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles (Butterworths Toronto 1991)428. 
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Canada has seen fit to introduce dynamic statutory reforms in relation to share-
holder remedies as a whole, following the recommendations of the Dickerson 
Committee.5' The main remedies are the oppression remedy, Appraisal Rights, and 
the Statutory Derivative action. Of particular relevance to the present discussion is 
the statutory derivative action, which replaces the rule in Foss v Harbottle*2 Other 
than providing for the complainant" to apply to the court for leave to bring or 
defend an action on behalf of the corporation, it specifically provides that an ac-
tion by a minority shareholder shall not be stayed or diminished merely because 
the breach of duty in question is capable of ratification or has been ratified by the 
shareholders .5J The fact of ratification is to be regarded merely as evidence to be 
taken into account by the court in making an order. The Dickerson Committee also 
suggested a criteria for assessing the evidential value of a ratification. It said, "If, 
for example, the alleged misconduct was ratified by majority shareholders who 
were also the directors whose conduct was attacked, evidence of shareholder rati-
fication would carry little or no weight. If, however, the alleged misconduct was 
ratified by a majority of disinterested shareholders after full disclosure of the 
facts, that evidence would carry much more weight indicating that the majority of 
disinterested shareholders condoned the act or dismissed it as a mere error of busi-
ness judgment".55 
Such a provision would eliminate what has been described as "the major absurdity 
of the Foss v Harbottle rule".*6 It would have the advantage of having the case of 
the minority shareholder heard on its merits without denying the majority share-
holders the court's consideration of the fact of ratification. 
Would this open the company and/or its officers to the floodgates of litigation or 
otherwise encourage futile litigation, a matter which is considered to be one of the 
reasons for the rule in Foss v Harbottle? I think not. Given that shareholders are 
generally averse to litigation, coupled with the fact that such litigation must be at 
their own cost and time (unless the court deems it appropriate to give an order for 
costs against the company), it is unlikely that minority shareholders will become 
"litigation happy" unless their case is a meritorious one. Further, the statutory 
derivative action has failed to make a dramatic impact because of the availability 
of the "oppression" remedy.57 
51 R W Dickerson, J L Howard and L Getz. Proposals for a new Business Corporations Law tor Canada {the 
Dickerson Report) 1971. 
52 Above n 13. 
53 Define in s 238. 
54 Section242{l). 
55 Dickerson Report 1971, above n 51, para. 487 and cited in Jill Poole and Pauline Robert. Shareholder 
Remedies-Corporate Wrongs and the Derivative Action". (1999) J.B.L. 99 at 110. 
56 Gower, Modern Company Law (3rt ed) 86, referred to in Saul Fridman, "Ratification of Directors Breaches" 
< 1992) C & S.L.J. 252 at 272. 
57 See Brian R Cheffins and J M Dine, "Shareholder Remedies: Lessons from Canada" (1992) 13 Co. Law 89 
at 94. 
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In Australia, the Corporations Law permits a member to make an application to 
the court for an order, inter alia, authorising the member to institute proceedings 
on behalf of the company,58 This is permitted, inter alia, in situations where op-
pression, unfair prejudice, and unfair discrimination has occurred. Previously, 
though such statutory derivative action may be ordered, there was no provision 
which expressly touched the effect of ratification of the breach of duty, on the right 
of the member to such an order. Thus, despite the availability of such statutory 
derivative action, aggrieved shareholders would still have been stymied by proof 
of corporate approval of a director's breach of duty.59 
However, this situation has been altered by the Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program Act 199960 which has introduced many amendments to the Corporations 
Law, Section 23961 of the Corporations Law now contains a provision to the effect 
that ratification would not preclude the standing of a shareholder in a derivative 
action. It would merely be a factor to be taken into consideration in deciding on an 
order. The section further stipulates a test to evaluate the standing of a ratifying 
resolution. It requires the court to have regard to, "(a) how well informed about the 
conduct the members were when deciding whether to ratify or approve the con-
duct; and (b) whether the members who ratified or approved the conduct were 
acting for proper purposes".62 
This new provision is to be welcomed. However, in addition to the two matters 
which the court is to have regard to, it would be an improvement also to require the 
court to have regard to the extent to which the wrongdoing directors had used their 
influence as directors or their own votes as shareholders to secure the ratification. 
It could perhaps be argued that this point may already be subsumed under require-
ment (b) above, as members may not be acting for proper purposes if they were 
influenced by the directors or if the directors themselves voted as shareholders. 
But, as has been suggested by Professor Baxt,6J ratification is best done by a disin-
terested majority of shareholders. If ratification is to be permitted and the fact of 
ratification is to be only of evidentiary value, then the "independentness" or other-
wise, of the ratification ought to be given due consideration. 
In the United Kingdom, s 459 of the English Companies Act 1985 provides for a 
remedy to a member in cases where the company's affairs are being or have been 
conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the members. Section 461 further 
58 See in particular s 260 (2) (g). 
59 Saul Fridman. "Ratification of Breach of Directors Duties" above n52. 
60 Following from the recommendations of the CSLRC, Enforcement of the Duties of Directors and officers of 
a Company by means of a Statutory Derivative Action, Report No 12 (1990) and the CASAC, Report on a 
Statutory Derivative Action (1993). 
61 as amended by the CLERP Act 1999. 
62 Section 239 (2); cited in Jill Poole and Pauline Roberts, "Shareholder remedies-Corporate wrongs and the 
Derivative Action", above n 55 at 109. 
63 Above n 31. 
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provides that the court, upon being satisfied that the members petition is well 
founded, may make, inter alia, an order authorising civil proceedings to be brought 
in the name and on behalf of the company. However, it does not contain any 
express provision as to the effect of any ratification of the breach in question upon 
the right of the shareholder to institute such derivative action. 
In 1995 the Law Commission was requested "to carry out a review of shareholder 
remedies with particular reference to:- the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 
461 and its exceptions; sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985; and the en-
forcement of the rights of shareholders under the articles of association and to 
make recommendations".*1 Pursuant to the said terms of reference, a Consultation 
Paper65 was published in 1996. Subsequently a Report was published in 1997.64 
The Report recommended, inter alia, the introduction of a statutory derivative 
action to replace the present derivative action. (The merits or otherwise of the 
proposed derivative action and procedure are not pursued here). 
In so far as the issue of ratification is concerned, the report acknowledges the 
complexity by stating, "There is danger that our desire to simplify the derivative 
action could be undermined by the complexities which arise where it is claimed 
that the relevant breach of duty has been, (or, may be) ratified".61 
What is rather disturbing is that the Report concluded that a shareholder should 
not be granted leave to proceed by way of the statutory derivative action where 
ratification has occurred. Thus, a major obstacle to the derivative action which 
other jurisdictions, like Canada and now, Australia, have found fit to eliminate, 
remains a pitfall for the shareholder in the U K. In cases where no ratification has 
taken place, a shareholder will still be able to proceed. But what if the company, 
subsequently, ratifies the breach in question? The action will, in all likelihood, be 
struck out.68 
The English position is therefore not as dynamic and modern as it could be. The 
recommendations preserve the conservative Foss v Harbottle rule, protecting the 
company from "unnecessary shareholder interference".69 The Law Commission 
also seems to have considered that enlarging the circumstances in which indi-
vidual shareholders can bring derivative actions would result in an increase of 
legal proceedings. However, this may be an unfounded fear as Canadian experi-
64 Law Commission, Shareholders' Remedies, Consultation Paper No. 142, (July 1996 London HMSO) 
para 1.2. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Law Commission Report, Shareholders Remedies, Law Com. No 246<Cm.3769 October 1997 London HMSO), 
see also: Jill Poole and Pauline Roberts, "Shareholder Remedies - Corporate Wrongs and the 
Derivative Action", above n 55. 
67 para 6.81; also cited in Poole and Roberts, "Corporate Wrongs and the Derivative Action" ibid. 
68 Poole and Roberts, ibid at 109. 
69 Consultation paper, above n 63 at para 4.11. 
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ence indicates that there have been relatively few derivative actions in public com-
panies.70 It has also been argued that, "these shareholders are unlikely to take the 
risk of pursuing an action since there is no guarantee of securing an indemnity 
against costs and any remedy will be for the company with only indirect benefits 
for the shareholders".71 
In Singapore, s 21672 is the approximate equivalent of the Australian s 23273 and 
the English s 459.74 That section provides a remedy to a shareholder in cases of 
oppression, disregard, prejudice and unfair discrimination. Where the petitioner 
has established his case, the court may make certain orders as provided in s 216(2). 
Although the section states generally that the court may make any order it thinks 
fit, s 216 (2) (c) specifically provides that the court may "authorise civil proceed-
ings to be brought on the name of or on behalf of the company by such persons as 
the court may direct". Thus, a statutory derivative action in the context of oppres-
sion, disregard, prejudice and unfair discrimination is available to a shareholder. 
However, that section does not touch the issue of the effect of ratification. 
In 1993, Singapore introduced amendments to its Companies Act 1967.7S Inter 
alia, the amendments provide for a statutory derivative action. A new s 216A and 
s 216B were introduced, along the lines of the Canadian Business Corporations 
Act. In particular, s 216B(1) provides that: 
-"An application made or an action brought or intervened in under section 216A 
shall not be stayed or dismissed by reason only that it is shown that an alleged 
breach of a right or duty owed to the company has been or may be approved by the 
members of the company, but evidence of approval by the members may be taken 
into account in making an order under section 216A". 
Thus, like the Canadian and the new Australian position, the fact of ratification or 
possibility of ratification will have evidentiary value but will not be a bar to a 
derivative action. Sadly, however, these provisions76 only apply to non listed com-
panies.77 'The reason for leaving out listed companies was the fear that unscrupu-
lous people would make frivolous applications to harass listed companies and 
thereby attempt to manipulate the share price".78 Section 216A does not preclude 
70 See Poole and Roberts, etc, above n 55r 
71 Ibid, citing B R Cheffins, "Reforming the Derivative Action; The Canadian Experience and British Prospects" 
(1997) Cf iLR 227 at 259-260. 
72 Companies Act 1967. 
73 Corporations Law. 
74 Companies Act 1935. 
75 Via Companies (Amendment) Act 1993. 
76 Sections 216A and 216B. 
77 Section 216A0) , which defines a company to mean, "a company other than a company that is listed on the 
Stock Exchange in Singapore". 
78 Walter Woon, Company Law, (FTLaw andTax Asia Pacific, Singapore 1997) at 343, footnote 131. 
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common law derivative actions. In the case of listed companies, only the common 
law procedure is allowed,7* 
As stated above, the Canadian experience did not result in a substantial surge of 
derivative actions following their virtual abolition of the Foss v Harbottle rule. 
Even if there is likely to be some increase in litigation, it would seem to me that 
there is a greater need to check abuse in public listed companies which have at 
their disposal vast amounts of public money. The procedure for the statutory de-
rivative action requires that the court must be satisfied that the complainant is 
acting in good faith and it must prima facie be in the interests of the company that 
the action should be brought,80 
Therefore, the fear that frivolous applications would be made appears more imagi-
nary than real. In Malaysia, s 181(1) of the Companies Act 196581 provides for a 
remedy in cases of oppression, disregard, prejudice and unfair discrimination. Sec-
tion 181(2) provides that the court, upon being satisfied that the applicant has 
established his case under s 181(1), may make "such order as it thinks fit" but, in 
particular, stipulates several orders in s 181(2) (a) - (e). None of those orders is a 
statutory derivative action, unless the general provision stated above can be inter-
preted to encompass every possibility including the derivative action. The 
Malaysian legislation in this regard is sorely in need of revision. It is suggested 
that changes along the lines of the Canadian position ought to be adopted in 
Malaysia. 
In conclusion, it may be stated that the law on ratification is still in a muddled 
state. Difficulties exist, in particular, with regard to who may ratify, what breaches 
may be ratified, and the effect of any such ratification (or proposed ratification) 
upon: 
1. The act or transaction in question vis a vis the third party, 
2. The liability of directors/agents to the company for a breach of their 
duties, and 
3. The right of the shareholder to institute a derivative action on behalf of the 
company. 
There is a need to control the extent to which directors may use their voting power 
as shareholders to ratify transactions in which they have an interest. In this respect 
it has been suggested above that ratification should be made by an independent 
majority of shareholders, taking into account also the fairness of the price paid by 
the corporation, as is the position in the U S. 
79 Ibid. 
80 S.2l6A(3Xb)and(c). 
81 Which is approximately equivalent to the Singapore s 216. 
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In relation to release of directors from liability for breach, it is suggested that the 
better approach would be to require a separate special resolution to that effect, as is 
required under the English Companies Act 1985 in relation to ultra vires transac-
tions. 
It is further concluded that neither a ratification nor the possibility of it should be 
a bar to a minority shareholder who wishes to institute a derivative action. In this 
respect the Canadian model, which has already been adopted in Singapore to a 
large extent, may be the best alternative. It is further suggested that provisions be 
made stipulating a test for the standing of a ratification along the lines of s 239 of 
the Corporations Law as amended by the CLERP Act 1999s3 and also taking into 
account the independentness of the ratification.83 
82 discussed above ai p i5, 
S3 discussed above at p 16. 
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